Introduction
Tobacco use is the largest preventable cause of disease and death in the world, causing about five million deaths annually, a toll projected to rise to 10 million by the 2020s, 70% of which will be in developing countries ). This epidemic is promoted by an industry that has argued that efforts to reduce tobacco use would have dire economic implications, especially in developing countries, and that efforts to regulate the production and marketing violate international trade laws (Warner, 2000) . Because policy-making within the United Nations, including its World Health Organization (WHO), is statecentric, tobacco companies have used these economic arguments to convince member states to obstruct tobacco control policy development.
In 1995, the World Health Assembly, WHO's policymaking body, began developing what became the 2003 WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (WHO, 2003) . WHO Director General Gro Harlem Brundtland made tobacco control a cabinet project, and the FCTC passage one of her two priorities (along with malaria) when she took office in 1998.
When Brundtland took office, the World Bank was developing recommendations on tobacco control. To provide an authoritative review of the economics of tobacco control, researchers in the Bank's Health, Nutrition and Population sector, led by Prahbat Jha, started a study that, in May 1999, resulted in the Bank's publication Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control (CTE) (Jha & Chaloupka, 1999) . CTE concluded that, with the exception of a very few agrarian countries heavily dependant on tobacco, tobacco control can bring unprecedented health benefits without harming economies.
WHO used CTE as a background technical document to provide the economic justification for the FCTC, as did the Framework Convention Alliance (FCA), the organization of civil society organizations that lobbied for a strong FCTC (Mamudu & Glantz, in press) . As a financial institution with substantial influence in developing countries 1 (Ruger, 2005) , the Bank's publication of CTE threatened to undermine the tobacco companies' economic arguments. As a consequence, the companies worked, without success, to discredit CTE and to counter its conclusions through a public relations campaign, critiques prepared by paid academics, ''independent'' economic analyses and front groups (particularly the International Tobacco Growers' Association, ITGA 2,3 ).
Tobacco companies resist tobacco control at all levels of governance (Saloojee & Dagli, 2000; WHO, 2000) , whether domestic, (Brandt, 2007; Landman, Ling, & Glantz, 2002; Mandel, Bialous, & Glantz, 2006; Ong & Glantz, 2001; Tsoukalas & Glantz, 2003) regional, (Ashraf, 2002; Barnoya & Glantz, 2002; European Commission, 2004; Gilmore & McKee, 2004; Neuman, Bitton, & Glantz, 2002) , or global (Francey & Chapman, 2000; Landman, Cortese, & Glantz, 2008; Muggli & Hurt, 2003; Ong & Glantz, 2000; Satcher, 2001; WHO, 2000; Yach & Bettcher, 2000) . The industry worked directly and through surrogates to divert attention from the public health issues raised by tobacco consumption, attempting to reduce budgets for WHO's scientific and policy activities, pitting other UN agencies against WHO, distorting scientific studies, and trying to convince developing countries that tobacco control is a ''First World'' agenda.
The companies' activities can be understood as transnational corporations' behavior in the world political economy with the instrumental motive of maximizing profit (Charney, 1983; Gilpin, 2001; Keohane & Nye, 1972; Sikkink, 1986; Sklair, 2002) . The major tobacco companiesPhilip Morris (PM), British American Tobacco (BAT), and Japan Tobacco International (JTI), which together control over 41% of the worldwide tobacco market -are based in developed countries, but operate globally (Davis, Wakefield, Amos, & Gupta, 2007; Mackay, Eriksen, & Shafey, 2006; Sklair, 2002; Yach & Bettcher, 2000) . This globalization of the industry, which makes it difficult for a single country to regulate it (Charney, 1983; Lowi, 2001 ) and the associated tobacco epidemic, stimulated the creation of the FCTC (Bettcher & Subramaniam, 2001; Satcher, 2001; WHO, 2003) .
International political and legal action can lead to significant pressure on transnational corporations from domestic laws or political-economic decisions that follow from the development of international norms (Charney, 1983) . The tobacco industry is not just an economic entity but also an organized interest group (Charney, 1983; Grant, Martinelli, & Paterson, 1989; Lowi, 2001; Sklair, 2002) aware of the necessity to promote its interests in the international treaty-making process (Charney, 1983; Lowi, 2001; Malanczuk, 2000) . The FCTC negotiation rules made state the only formal participants, with non-state actors (including the tobacco industry) as observers (Mamudu & Glantz, in press ). Because the companies could not represent themselves directly in the negotiations, they lobbied delegates during the FCTC negotiations in Geneva and policy-makers at the country level (Charney, 1983; Higgot, 1996; Mamudu & Glantz, in press; Sally, 1996; Strange, 1992; Wilson, 1990) .
Having lost the argument on the health effects, the industry focused on the potential-economic implications of the FCTC for developing countries, particularly its alleged negative impact on employment and government revenue. Because the industry selected this frame to oppose the FCTC, it became particularly important for them to undercut CTE because it was the key WHO (and FCA) technical background document on these issues. These efforts, however, did not undermine acceptance of CTE during the FCTC negotiations and CTE has remained an authoritative economic analysis of global tobacco control.
Methods
We used internal tobacco industry documents available at the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library. ucsf.edu), the British American Tobacco (BAT) Document Archive (http://bat.library.ucsf.edu) and Tobacco Documents Online (http://tobaccodocuments.org). Between August 2005 and November 2007, we used standard search techniques, beginning with the terms ''World Bank report,'' ''Curbing the epidemic,'' ''Economic impact studies,'' and ''economics of tobacco control'' to locate documents. We conducted followup searches using Bates numbers near informative documents and names of individuals and organizations identified in the documents. We retrieved over 1000 documents and selected 150 for detailed analysis. (These publicly available documents may not be the complete record of all tobacco industry activities against CTE, which may limit our knowledge of such activities.) We used WHO and World Bank archival documents and Internet search engines to corroborate the tobacco documents.
Results

Shifting the position of the World Bank on tobacco control
The World Bank's mission is to support development and reduce poverty. The Bank has evolved from having no presence in global health to become a major financier of health (Ruger, 2005) , exceeding US$10 billion for health in 2003 (World Bank, 2006) .
Until the early 1990s, the Bank supported tobacco growing and manufacturing as part of developing economies' productive base 4,5 (Ramin, 2006) . However, in 1991, the Bank adopted a policy of not supporting tobacco production because of the health consequences of tobacco use 5-8 (Ramin, 2006) . Economic analysis by the Bank at the time also concluded that the ''global welfare cost of tobacco projects greatly exceed the gains to producer countries. '' 6 The Bank issued a Directive to implement the policy in 1992.
7
In the early 1990s, Howard Barnum, a senior Bank economist provided a new perspective on tobacco in developing countries based on welfare economics.
9
According to Barnum, unlike other consumption choices, the economic presumption of market efficiency does not apply to smoking because many smokers are not fully aware of tobacco's health dangers and because of tobacco's addictiveness 9 (Barnum, 1994) , particularly because most begin smoking as children. The inevitable conclusion of this economic understanding was that reducing tobacco use would provide net social benefits 9 (Barnum, 1994) . Barnum concluded in a 1994 article that, ''The world tobacco market produces an annual global loss of US$200 billion'' (Barnum, 1994 acknowledge that her employer, ESEF, had received these monies from the tobacco industry.
Strategies against curbing the epidemic after it was published
All three major tobacco companies -PM, BAT, and JTIworked individually and collaboratively to discredit CTE (Table 1) . Weinberg Group, a Washington, DC, consulting firm that had previously worked with the tobacco industry to oppose smoking restrictions (Barnoya & Glantz, 2002 By August 1999, BAT had paid SIRES Inc. US$6,250 and £3,865 under its ''WTO/World Bank'' project (Table 1) .
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There is evidence that suggests that Philip Morris commissioned Lemieux to place articles in the context of action which was being coordinated by the tobacco companies against CTE. An April 2000 memo by BAT's CORA Manager for Southern Europe on industry FCTC activities in France indicates that PM ''commissioned'' Lemieux to write a paper to ''start building up arguments against [CTE]'' and perhaps place articles on his view of CTE in the media. 87 In January 1999, Lemieux published a critique of the social costs argument for tobacco control that the World Bank policy on tobacco in The National Post of Canada, 88,89 but it is unclear whether this article was commissioned by the industry as it pre-dates the memo.
The international tobacco growers' association (ITGA)
The ITGA presents itself as representative of tobacco farmers around the world. 90 As of November 2007, the ITGA's public website did not mention its relationship with PM, BAT and JTI, despite its having been an important front group for the companies in international tobacco control issues for many years 21,91,92 (WHO, 2000; Yach & Bettcher, 2000) . The companies saw the ITGA as the most promising vehicle to discredit CTE (Table 1) . In April 1999, before CTE was released, Millson emailed BAT CORA managers instructing them to use a BAT analysis 93 of ''Draft 4'' 65 of CTE to contact ITGA members in their countries and help them write local ministries and follow through ITGA's initiative to lobby governments in a globally orchestrated effort to oppose the FCTC.
2
In 1999, Hallmark PR, a UK-based public relations firm BAT employed to manage ITGA activities (Must, 2001) , developed a £30,000 plan for ITGA for July to December 1999 to respond to ''new industry-wide issues,'' which included the need to Respond robustly to the World Bank report and similar WHO-inspired reports with independent comment and analysis.. Prepare independent economic responses to key WHO and World Bank publications in order to demonstrate their flaws and partiality in relation to the tobacco crop. Publicize these by briefing documents, academic papers, and a campaign for growers to lobby national governments.
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In May 1999, Hallmark outlined ideas for an ITGA ''PR Program for 2000'' to oppose the FCTC and claimed ''there is no support from honest economists'' for the CTE.
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The £220,400 ''Grower Public Relations Plan and Budget Proposal for 2000,'' which approved at a meeting in New York City in October 1999 to undermine CTE and weaken governments' support for the FCTC was apparently partly funded by BAT and that there are indications that other tobacco companies may have paid the balance.
95 £95,000 of the budget was to ''Organise a 'Roadshow' of briefings on the World Bank report and WHO activity in London, Africa, Asia and Latin America [to] get major messages to opinion leaders directly, in a year when FCTC is under intensive development. This will be the major PR action in 2000. '' 95 There was a review meeting with the growers involving BAT, PM, and JTI in London on September 21, 2000. Impact of the ''Roadshow''
ITGA's report on the Roadshow claimed it had a positive impact on policy-makers. 103 One news report on the In 2003, FAO published a two-volume report on the importance of tobacco to national economies (FAO, 2003a (FAO, , 2003b concluding that, ''while it is clearly the case that some people in some countries may suffer, the impact of any moderate contraction in the tobacco market, particularly if it were to occur slowly, might have only a limited impact on most tobacco producing countries '' (FAO, 2003b) .
Economic studies of individual countries
The preparation of industry-sponsored economic impact studies has been a strategy of the transnational tobacco companies to undermine tobacco control, particularly at the national and local levels (Warner, 2000) . PM believed that such economic analysis ''could be useful in moderating the WHO Secretariat and in encouraging other affected interests (e.g., growers) to become more engaged in WHO policy development. ' Although there may indeed be some points of commonality, there are also very wide differences between the missions of our two organizations. Our work in the World Bank has a very strong focus on improving the health and lives of the poor people. On the other hand, smoking puts the health and lives of millions of people in the world, particularly in the developing countries at serious risk. This is why the Bank attaches such high priority to tobacco control in developing countries.
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JTI also failed to influence the Bank's stand on tobacco, despite many attempts by its consultants to obtain information and influence.
126,127
Discussion It has been suggested by Assunta and Chapman (2006) and Otanez, Mamudu, and Glantz (in press ) that during the FCTC negotiation tobacco companies covertly and overtly worked to undermine and weaken the FCTC through states such as Japan and Malawi respectively. Also, it has been suggested by Carter and Simpson (2002) and Mamudu and Glantz (in press ) that tobacco companies tried to weaken civil society support for the FCTC by infiltrating tobacco control organizations to create discord among them. Other research works suggest that tobacco companies used corporate social responsibility programs (Hirschhorn, 2004) such as ''youth smoking prevention'' (Landman et al, 2002; Mandel et al., 2006; Sebrie & Glantz, 2007) , media campaigns, (Metzler, 2001; Szczypaka et al., 2007) and voluntary codes (Pollay, 1994; Richards, Tye, & Fischer, 1996) to gain public credibility, have access to policymakers, and divert attention away from the public health problem caused by tobacco consumption. During the FCTC negotiations, PM, BAT, and JTI collaborated to internationalize these under ''project Cerberus,'' and developed the 2001 International Tobacco Products Marketing Standards to serve as an alternative to the FCTC and undermine global tobacco control (Mamudu, Hammond, & Glantz, 2008) . There are numerous published works that suggest that the industry has a history of disinformation through manipulating research (Barnes & Bero, 1996; Bero, 2005; Bero, Glantz, & Hong, 2005; Chapman, 2005; Malone & Bero, 2003; Ong & Glantz, 2000) and generating false controversies on the effects of tobacco use and secondhand smoke (Drope & Chapman, 2001; Glantz, Barnes, Bero, Hanauer, & Slade, 1995; Hirschhorn, 1999; Landman et al., 2008; Ong & Glantz, 2001; WHO, 2000) . If the above is true, then the industry's activities to undercut CTE follow this pattern in that the companies rely on economic arguments. The companies rely on economic arguments of potential negative impacts of tobacco regulation on international trade and on national economies to convince governments, primarily in developing countries, against implementation of effective tobacco control measures. In contrast, independent economic analysis of tobacco since the early 1990s (Barnum, 1994) showed that tobacco was a burden on developing countries' economies.
The accumulated scientific evidence on the health dangers of tobacco use and its own economic analysis supporting tobacco control motivated the World Bank to shift its policy on tobacco from supporting tobacco production projects to supporting tobacco control 6,7 (Ramin, 2006) . The new economic paradigm for tobacco and tobacco control within the Bank led to CTE in 1999, which concluded that tobacco control is not only good for health, but also good for the economy. Tobacco companies correctly perceived CTE as a threat because it undermined their ability to use economic arguments to dissuade governments from supporting tobacco control and because of the Bank's global influence, especially on policy-making in developing countries. WHO used CTE as a technical document that provided economic justification for the FCTC and FCA used CTE to lobby national delegates.
Because of their realization of CTE's importance to the FCTC negotiations, the companies worked individually and collaboratively to discredit CTE's key arguments and conclusions to obstruct the FCTC. The industry identified and funded critics who did not disclose their sources of funding, but sought to have the media and policy-makers view all those critiques which supported their position (Bero, 2005; Bero et al., 2005; Landman et al., 2008; Malone & Bero, 2003) . The companies also disseminated these critiques when they supported the industry's position. Even though PM hired Ingo Walter to critique CTE, it does not seem to have disseminated his conclusion that it was an innovative work. The companies' activities failed to compromise the value of CTE during the FCTC negotiations because CTE was not only the product of the World Bank but also, as industry consultant Walter pointed out, it was a ''competent piece of work. '' 66 In addition, the fact that the Bank started to develop its new analytic work on the economics of tobacco and tobacco control in early 1990s gave the Bank's Health, Nutrition and Population sector team the opportunity to present its analytical framework and findings to academics and policy-makers for comments, criticisms and suggestions. By the time CTE was published, the ideas it contained had been well vetted. The failure of the industry to undercut CTE reflects not only CTE's technical quality, but also the fact that the WHO leadership anticipated the industry's effort and was able to counter this effort. It also suggests that it is important for the Bank to continue its analytic work in the economics of tobacco control and support the development of tobacco control policies and programs around the world during the FCTC implementation phase. Tobacco consumption is not only linked to disease, but also to poverty and economic development (United Nations, 2000; Wagstaff & Claeson, 2004) . Because the World Bank wields influence around the world, it can integrate tobacco control into the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, the main UN development program to cut poverty in half by 2015 (Magnusson, 2007 ; UN Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Task Force on Tobacco Control, 2004).
Conclusion
The tobacco companies' activities against CTE illustrate the extent to which transnational corporations in the global political economy will go to engage international political and legal processes perceived to be a threat to the realization of their economic motive of profit maximization. These activities are another illustration of the tobacco industry effort to manipulate science and undermine research whose conclusions do not favor the industry. The industry failure to undercut CTE suggests that good research work can withstand criticisms from the industry and the importance of the World Bank continuing its analytic work on the economics of tobacco control.
Appendix. Supplementary data
Supplementary references associated with this article are indicated with superscripts and can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.09.062.
